John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard by Gleicher, Nathaniel
NATHANIEL GLEICHER
John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal
Standard
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an important shield for valuable speech, it also protects online harassment that can chill or
completely silence the speech of its targets. This Note argues that the public figure doctrine
should be adapted to John Doe subpoenas to distinguish between online harassment and more
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plaintiffs and defendants and helps judges to distinguish online harassment from other forms of
anonymous speech.
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Anonymous speech conjures the image of a pamphleteer who speaks out
against corruption, defying the voices of power and publishing anonymously
for fear of reprisal. Two centuries ago, pamphleteers worked on printing
machines, distributing their words by pony express and stagecoach. Our
Founding Fathers debated the makeup of the fledgling United States under
pseudonyms.' Today, anonymous speakers use blogs, message boards, and
online wikis to reach millions of readers. In these new media, which are
virtually free of production and delivery costs, anyone can become a modern-
day muckraker, exposing scandal and speaking out against fraud from the
safety of his or her computer. From anonymous message boards criticizing
massive corporations,2 to citizens who scrutinize elected officials,3 to websites
that enable the anonymous release of government and corporate documents,4
the Internet has expanded the cape of anonymity to shield an army of
pamphleteers.
The Internet can keep speakers anonymous, but it can also thrust
unsuspecting subjects into the harsh eye of the public. A high school boy who
videotaped himself imitating a Jedi, with a golf club in place of a lightsaber,
became an international sensation when other students posted his video on
YouTube. It quickly became one of the most watched videos on the Internet,
spawning a legion of imitations and mashups. The teasing-at school, around
town, and online-was merciless.' The megaphone of the Internet does not
merely magnify socially conscious speech. It also lends casual bullying a global
1. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995) (describing Publius,
the pen name under which Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison wrote The
Federalist Papers).
2. See, e.g., ComCraptic.com - Your Chance To Tell Everyone How You Feel About Comcast
Products and Service, http://comcraptic.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2oo8);
DeltaReallySucks.com, http://deltareallysucks.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
3. See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (rejecting a city councilman's attempt
to unmask an anonymous critic).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Judge Reverses His Order Disabling Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2008, at All; Adam Liptak & Brad Stone, Judge Shuts Down Web Site Specializing in Leaks,
Raising Constitutional Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, at A14.
5. See Star Wars Kid Is Top Viral Video, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/entertainmenV6l87554.stm; Tu Thanh Ha, 'Star Wars Kid' Cuts a Deal with His
Tormentors, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 7, 2006, atA8.
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reach.6 New technology has made harassment more possible and powerful
online even as it has empowered modern-day pamphleteers to speak
anonymously to ever-growing audiences.
Combining these two phenomena reveals the dark side of anonymous
online speech. Anonymity increasingly serves as a cover for gossip, defamation,
harassment, and even assault on the Internet. Faceless crowds of online
tormentors wield virtual pitchforks, carry virtual torches, and hound innocent
targets into hiding and out of the online world entirely.7 The consequences of
these attacks can be felt in the real world, impacting targets' personal lives and
putting them in fear for their safety.8 The most common targets are women
who are singled out and attacked online with violent threats of physical and
sexual assault. 9 Racist, homophobic, and anti-religious attacks are also
prevalent.1" According to Danielle Citron, a key element in the rise of these
attacks is that the speakers remain anonymous: "Individuals say and do things
online that they would never consider saying or doing offline because they feel
anonymous .... "" Whereas anonymity has been traditionally viewed as a
shield for the individual against tyranny, in this context it enables a majority to
terrorize the few.
The rise of online harassment challenges the traditional justifications for
anonymous speech. The most common argument for anonymity is that it
increases the ability of people to speak, and protects speech that might not
otherwise be heard. Harassment under cover of anonymity, however, can stifle
6. See, e.g., Mattathias Schwartz, Inside the World of Online Trolls, Who Use the Internet To
Harass, Humiliate and Torment Strangers: Malwebolence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008
(Magazine), at 24.
7. See, e.g., Blog Death Threats Spark Debate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6499o95.stm (describing the concerted verbal
attacks on Kathy Sierra, a well-known technology blogger, that prompted her to cancel her
public appearances and shut down her blog).
8. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Boalt Student Posts "Copycat Threat" to Hastings, Law Blog-
WSJ.com, Apr. 20, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2oo7/o4/2o/boalt-student-allegedly-
posts-copycat-threat-to-hastings-law; Mitch Wagner, Death Threats Force Designer To Cancel
ETech Conference Appearance, InformationWeek, Digital Life Weblog, Mar. 26, 2007,
http://www.informationweek.con/blog/main/archives /20o7/03/death_threatsf.html.
9. The volunteer organization Working To Halt Online Abuse reports that more than seventy
percent of the victims of online harassment it has worked with since 2000 have been
women. Working To Halt Online Abuse, Comparison Statistics 2000-2007,
http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2008).
1o. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 6; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17-18, on file with author).
11. Citron, supra note io, at 21.
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the speech of its targets. Indeed, those overwhelmingly targeted by online
harassment- members of social minorities-are those most in need of
protection. Silencing the contributions of the targets of online harassment
"impoverish[es] the dialogue society depends upon for purposes great and
small." 2 Thus, anonymous harassing speech may reduce, rather than enhance,
the amount and quality of online speech.
Legal enforcement in this vast and changing environment is precariously
balanced on a single procedural tool: the John Doe subpoena. Because of the
unique structure of the Internet, the identities of most supposedly
"anonymous" posters, while impenetrable to the casual observer, are tracked
and stored by the websites on which they post and by the Internet service
providers (ISPs) that provide them with Internet access. 13 John Doe subpoenas
allow plaintiffs to discover the identity of anonymous online speakers from
their ISP or from websites they visited. Without a successful John Doe
subpoena, a target of anonymous online speech has no way to uncover his or
her attackers and no legal remedy. Although John Doe subpoenas are
procedural tools, the standards governing them define the extent of First
Amendment rights online. A standard that is too permissive severely weakens
the ability of citizens to speak anonymously, limiting freedom of speech online.
Too restrictive a standard leaves the increasing litany of targets of online
harassment with no defense. Only a consistent nationwide standard for John
Doe subpoenas will ensure balanced protection for both anonymous online
speakers and the targets of anonymous online speech.
Despite their importance, John Doe subpoenas have no such single
standard. No fewer than seven different cases14 have expressed distinct
standards over the past nine years. These standards vary widely, making the
extent of the right to anonymous speech online uncertain. Although recent
standards have begun to achieve a measure of consistency, they are just
beginning to be tested against the rise of online harassment. This Note will
examine John Doe subpoenas, their history, and the standards that govern
them. Based on this analysis, it will evaluate the emerging consensus of recent
standards and recommend a single, consistent standard that fairly balances the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants and is flexible enough to address the
emerging paradigms of anonymous online speech.
12. Id. at 24.
13. See, e.g., Richard Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 2008, at
ST7.
14. See infra note 61.
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Part I of this Note examines the history of John Doe pleadings, the
procedure of modern John Doe subpoenas, and the unique challenges they
present. Part II argues that John Doe subpoena standards should be structured
to afford less anonymity to online speakers who chill more speech than they
create. Part III breaks John Doe subpoena standards down into six constituent
factors and evaluates what level of each factor is appropriate to balance the
interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. Part IV closes by presenting a single
standard that will fairly balance the First Amendment interests of both
plaintiffs and defendants, and by applying this proposed standard to a recent
online controversy.
I. WHAT IS A JOHN DOE SUBPOENA?
A. The Qualified Privilege ofAnonymous Speech
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court concluded that "an
author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning
omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.""I The Court based
McIntyre on two grounds -one of public concern and one of private concern.
First, "'[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority' without
which public discourse would certainly suffer."' 6 Second, the author's decision
to identify himself should be a question of authorial autonomy: "[A]n author
generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or her true identity.'
17
Since then, the Court has extended this logic to "the vast democratic forums of
the Internet,' 8 which "would be stifled if users were unable to preserve their
anonymity online."' 9
15. 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); see also id. at 345 (ruling that an Ohio law that forbade any
publication promoting a ballot issue unless it contained the "name and residence" of the
author was unconstitutional).
16. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1537, 1543 (2007) (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357).
17. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341.
18. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
ig. David L. Sobel, The Process That "John Doe" Is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet
Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 9 5 (2000), http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5iia3-
Sobel.html; see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 ("Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority."). But see Caroline E. Strickland, Note, Applying McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission to Anonymous Speech on the Internet and the Discovery of John Doe's Identity, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1537, 1580-82 (2001) (arguing that Mcintyre has been wrongly applied
118:320 20o8
JOHN DOE SUBPOENAS
Whether online or offline the right to anonymous speech is not absolute.
Lyrissa Lidsky recently argued that the "right" to anonymous speech is better
termed a "[q]ualified [p]rivilege, '' 20 as it is "not absolute but must be balanced
against plaintiffs' interests. 21 According to Lidsky, "[s]peakers may use the
shield of anonymity for a variety of purposes, only some of which may be
consistent with the public good. '2 Understanding the extent of this qualified
privilege requires a better understanding of the process of John Doe
subpoenas.
B. From John Doe Pleading to John Doe Subpoenas
Suits involving fictitious parties are a longstanding legal phenomenon.23
John Doe was first conceived as "an entirely fictional character," on whose
behalf plaintiffs could bring suits7 4 Later, this technique was used to enable
the initiation of proceedings against as yet unknown defendants. Civil rights
cases against law enforcement were the most common example of this
technique, where plaintiffs sued a set of unnamed police officers.2s Without a
pseudonymous John Doe, the plaintiff cannot file his suit until he knows the
identity of his defendant(s), and thus cannot rely on court-sanctioned
discovery tools to identify them. Allowing plaintiffs to sue Doe defendants
permits them to "start discovery while candidly acknowledging that [they do]
not yet know the correct identity of the defendant. "126
The rise of the Internet has brought an explosion of John Doe lawsuits.
While the identities of online speakers are impenetrable to most users,
companies running online message boards or connecting posters to the
Internet can often discover them. If someone discovers that a person is posting
to anonymous speech online because, among other things, it was focused on prior restraint
of speech).
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1599.
a. Id. at 16oo.
Id. at 1559.
See generally Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure To Recognize
John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 883, 889 (1996) (tracing the history of John Doe
pleadings).
Id. at 890 & n.22.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (holding that a cause of action existed for a plaintiff who was searched and arrested
without a warrant); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (holding local law
enforcement officers accountable for beating a suspect to death).
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violent and sexual threats about them on a message board, for instance, one of
the earliest steps in any legal response that they mount will be to seek the
poster's identity. Uncovering this identity often requires two steps. First, the
plaintiff must subpoena the website, or online service provider (OSP), for the
Internet protocol (IP) address of the user who made the online comments.
Assuming that the website has the information -many websites store the IP
addresses of the users who visit them, but some do not-it can provide the
plaintiff with the IP address of the poster. The IP address is a string of
numbers that identifies the computer, though not the person, that posted the
comment to the website.27
IP addresses, however, do not remain tied to an individual computer. Each
ISP owns a pool of IP addresses that it provides to its customers, often issuing
each customer a new IP address each time he connects to the Internet. Only the
ISP knows what IP address was attached to which computer at any given time.
Thus, the plaintiff must file another subpoena targeting the poster's ISP,
seeking the address, telephone number, and other contact information
associated with the account of the computer whose IP address he received from
the OSP. Often, the ISP will be able to identify both the computer using the
targeted IP address and the account information of that computer's owner.
This only establishes that the account owner was responsible for the computer
that was used to publish the speech in question. Unless the computer is stored
in a public space, or the account owner argues that some specific third party
used the computer without his permission, this is often enough for the plaintiff
to amend his complaint with the account owner's name as his defendant and
proceed with his suit. Assuming that the defendant has been properly notified,
he may anonymously move to quash one or both of the subpoenas. Because
defendants are much more likely to be notified by their ISP than by an OSP,
the initial IP address subpoena is rarely challenged in court."
Because John Doe subpoenas are the central tool for litigation in this area,
the standard that governs them effectively determines the breadth of the right
to anonymous speech on the Internet. A standard that is too weak decimates
the protection of anonymity, allowing plaintiffs to "pursue ... extra-judicial
self-help remedies" 9 by unmasking defendants who have said nothing
27. For a more detailed discussion of IP addresses and Internet infrastructure, see Jonathan
Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REv 653, 656-69 (2003).
28. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
29. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). For a classic example of plaintiff "self-
help," see Kailin Quistgaard, Raytheon Triumphs over Yahoo Posters'Anonymity, SALON.COM,
May 24, 1999, http ://www.salon.com/tech/log/i999/o5/24/raytheon/index.html.
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actionable and "simply seek revenge or retribution."30 On the other hand,
"anonymity may ... serve as a shield to hide behind, leaving a defamed
plaintiff without a potential defendant."'" In determining whether to protect a
defendant, courts must distinguish between instances in which anonymity is
critical, such as "governmental whistleblowing; labor organizing; dissident
movements in repressive countries; gay and lesbian issues; and resources
dealing with addiction, alcoholism, diseases and spousal abuse,"3 2 and contexts
in which it is not, such as defamation and harassment. John Doe subpoenas
must somehow thread this procedural needle, enabling courts to determine
when anonymity is an unscrupulous cloak and when it is a deserved shield.
C. The Unique Features ofJohn Doe Subpoenas
The challenges facing John Doe subpoenas stem from three related factors:
severity, timing, and notice. These three characteristics make balancing the
interests at stake particularly delicate. Because of these concerns, traditional
pleading rules may be insufficient to the task. First, John Doe subpoenas can
have severe consequences, potentially causing irreparable harm to defendants if
granted, and denying plaintiffs the opportunity to seek relief for their harms if
denied. A defendant who is exposed could be subject to reprisals33 or severe
social and professional sanctions, making extreme care necessary when
exposing potentially innocent defendants. At the same time, a plaintiff who is
denied the identity of his defendant is left with no recourse and has his suit
effectively denied without a hearing on the merits.
Second, John Doe subpoenas occur very early in the process of the trial, as
an element of expedited discovery that usually happens shortly after the filing
of the lawsuit. This exacerbates the problem of severe consequences by pairing
them with insufficient consideration. Further, a John Doe subpoena is rarely
served in the same court as the original case was brought-in the age of the
Internet, the headquarters of ISPs and OSPs are scattered across jurisdictions.
Thus, the court making this ruling will likely be different than the court where
the subpoena was filed and will not have the benefit of previous experience or a
ruling on the merits to guide its decision.
30. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457.
31. Scot Wilson, Comment, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line Between Anonymous
Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 533, 537 (2002).
32. Sobel, supra note 19, 6.
33. See, e.g., Quistgaard, supra note 29.
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Finally, although a motion to quash may well be appropriate, without
proper notice, John Doe subpoenas can easily become ex parte proceedings. In
many jurisdictions, defendants must rely on the business policies of the
subpoena's target or the goodwill of the plaintiff to receive notice. Even if the
plaintiff does attempt to notify the defendant, he could fail- the defendant is,
after all, anonymous. If the subpoena becomes ex parte, one of the defendant's
most important defenses-his own vigorous advocacy-is eliminated. This
combination of severe consequences meted out after limited trial process,
possibly without opposition from the defendant whose identity is at risk, is a
dangerous recipe that demands a carefully balanced standard.
34
II. DISTINGUISHING ONLINE HARASSMENT FROM TRADITIONAL
ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECH
The rise of online harassment, and especially public harassment of
individuals by anonymous groups, further complicates the traditional analysis
of anonymous speech. The right to anonymous speech is often defended
because it increases participation in public debate.3" Anonymous online
harassment, however, can frighten its targets into silence and drive them out of
public debate entirely. Because it largely targets minority groups, online
harassment has repercussions beyond its immediate targets, potentially
dissuading entire classes of speakers from public speech. Danielle Citron likens
modern online mobs to the "anti-immigrant mobs of the nineteenth century
and the Ku Klux Klan. '' 36 In this context, the identification of a speaker can be
a powerful tool to combat the chilling effect of online harassment. Indeed,
according to Citron, anonymity is one of the key features of the online
environment that encourages such harassment: "Because group members often
shroud themselves in pseudonyms, they have little fear that victims will
34. Michael Vogel has argued that John Doe subpoenas rely on "relatively mundane rules of
civil procedure" and that courts "should be hesitant to imply new procedural rules without
clear proof that existing rules are inadequate." Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking "John Doe"
Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REv.
795, 84o-41 (2004). This Note does not respond to Vogel point by point, but it asserts at
least three specific reasons why existing pleading rules are, in fact, inadequate: severe
consequences, occurrence of John Doe subpoenas early in trial, and possible lack of
opposition from an uninformed defendant.
35. For an in-depth analysis of the costs and benefits of anonymous speech, see Lidsky & Cotter,
supra note 16, at 1578-79.
36. Citron, supra note lo, at 19.
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retaliate against them .... 3 7 Exposing the identity of online speakers
eliminates this feeling of immunity and replaces it with one of accountability.
Regardless of the rising incidence of online harassment, anonymity is still a
vital shield to protect valuable speech -particularly criticism of powerful public
figures. Stripping anonymity away in these cases would make people less
willing to speak, limiting the Internet's potential to generate widespread public
debate. If John Doe subpoenas are to appropriately protect speech online, they
must balance the concerns of traditional anonymous speech with those raised
by anonymous online harassment.
John Doe subpoenas arise as part of many legal claims, including
defamation, trademark infringement, and even trespass to chattels. 38 For a
standard to balance fairly the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, it must
evaluate whether the substance of the plaintiff's claim is strong enough to
merit unmasking the defendant. Although John Doe subpoenas arise under
varied substantive claims, they all affect the right to anonymous speech online.
To accomplish this task, the standard should distinguish between anonymous
speech that enhances public discourse and anonymous speech that chills it. All
anonymous speech should be procedurally protected, but the bar that a
plaintiff must meet to expose a speaker of nonchilling anonymous speech
should be higher.
Courts have been most willing to protect speech that contributes to
important public debate.39 Although such speech may be harsh, vulgar, or
rude, protecting language that may be distasteful is necessary to ensure that the
debate itself may continue. At the same time, "[n]either the intentional lie nor
the careless error materially advances society's interest in" public debate.4 ° In
identifying speech that especially merits due protection in a defamation
context, the Court's inquiries have centered on whether the target of the speech
was a public figure. Regardless of the legal claim under which they arise, John
Doe subpoenas regulate the breadth of protected speech just as defamation law
does. Thus, public figure doctrine, adapted to the context of anonymous online
37. Id. at 21.
38. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (considering
identification of an anonymous defendant in a trademark infringement claim); Mobilisa,
Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P. 3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (considering a John Doe subpoena in a
claim of trespass to chattels); Doe No. i v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (considering a
John Doe subpoena in a defamation claim).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open....").
40. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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speech, can be a useful method to separate online harassment from public
debate.
A. Public Figure Doctrine
Public figure doctrine focuses on the status of the actor rather than the
content of the speech. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court concluded
that public officials had to meet an increased standard of liability to prove
defamation.4 Curtis Publishing Co.- v. Butts expanded upon this even further
when it concluded that "criticism of private citizens who seek to lead in the
determination of... policy [cannot] be less important to the public interest
than ... criticism of government officials. '42 This description could include
celebrities, political leaders, and corporations.
Gertz identified two distinctive features of public figures. First, they
"achieve that status voluntarily," opening them "to greater media scrutiny and
thus weaken[ing] their claim to protection from reputational harm. '43 Second,
their increased access to traditional media such as television and newspapers
"enables them to redress the harms inflicted by defamatory publications
through corrective speech."' Thus, Gertz identified public figures as (1) having
voluntarily acceded to publicity, and (2) being especially well equipped to
respond to actionable speech.
The Court has also identified two narrower types of public figures:
limited-purpose public figures and involuntary public figures. While public
figures must demonstrate actual malice for any defamation suit that they bring,
limited-purpose public figures must do so only regarding the particular
controversy in which they are embroiled. 4' Limited-purpose public figures
must "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies
41. 376 U.S. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'....").
42. 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (quoting Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ'g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196
(8th Cir. 1966)).
43. Aaron Perzanowski, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual
Malice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 833, 841 (2006).
44. Id. at 842.
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (finding that, because plaintiff was not a public figure in the
controversy concerning which he was defamed, the actual malice standard did not apply).
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in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."46 Time, Inc. v.
Firestone held that "public controversy" did not simply mean topics that
sparked the public interest.47 In that case, mere prurient fascination with the
breakup of a socialite's marriage was of public interest, but not a public
controversy. 48 Other than suggesting that a public controversy must be
significant, however, the Court has done little to define the concept. 49 While it
is certainly narrower than the full scope of issues that may be of interest to the
public, its boundaries remain uncertain. What plaintiffs must have done to
"thrust themselves to the forefront" of a controversy is similarly defined mostly
by exclusion.5" Firestone, for instance, concluded that "a few press conferences"
focused on the plaintiffs experiences were insufficient to make the plaintiff a
public figure.5 As this suggests, the exact delineation of the class of
limited-purpose public figures remains murky.
Closely related to the limited-purpose public figure is the involuntary
public figure. According to Gertz, "it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."52 In other words, an
individual who simply finds himself at the center of important societal events
46. Id. at 345. Lower courts have sought to add detail to this definition. The Fourth Circuit, for
instance, identified the five requirements for a limited-purpose public figure as: (1) the
plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication, (2) the plaintiff voluntarily
assumed a role of special prominence in a public controversy, (3) the plaintiff sought to
influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy, (4) the controversy existed prior to
the publication of the defamatory statements, and (5) the plaintiff retained public figure
status at the time of the alleged defamation. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 691 F.2d 666, 668
(4th Cir. 1982); see Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708 (4 th Cir. 1991).
47. 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 539-40 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing
that a dispute between a teacher's union and a school board was a public controversy);
Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 n.9 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(claiming that a debate over a fistfight at a high school wrestling match was a public
controversy in part because it "was not a private matter of public concern merely to
gossips").
50. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (holding that a scientist who was
awarded a mock award for wasteful government spending was not a public figure because
he was not a significant figure in any public controversy); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979) (holding that the petitioner, who was being investigated in an
espionage case and had refused to appear before a grand jury, was not at the forefront of a
public controversy).
51. 424U.S. at454-55 n.3.
52. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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could, in certain circumstances, be thrust into the role of a public figure. Like
limited-purpose public figures, involuntary public figures have been
mentioned in only a handful of Supreme Court cases beyond Gertz. Firestone
approvingly cited an academic article "concluding that the Gertz opinion
suggests a 'category of involuntary public figures' roughly equivalent to
'individual[s] involved in or affected by ... official action..'.. The Court in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire stated that "those charged with defamation cannot, by
their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public
figure,"' 4 suggesting that a plaintiff cannot be transformed into an involuntary
public figure by the very action that prompted his lawsuit. Most lower courts
have been as reticent to find an involuntary public figure as the Court has been
in discussing the concept."5
Public figure doctrine remains vague in part because it is designed to
manage a wide range of varying contexts. It was developed to maintain a
balance between the interests of private individuals and the need for vigorous
debate on public issues. John Doe subpoenas manage this same balancing act.
With some adaptation, public figure doctrine can be used to distinguish
between anonymous online harassment and anonymous public debate, making
it possible to distinguish which online speakers' anonymity is due particularly
high protection.
B. Adapting the Public Figure Standard to Anonymous Online Speech
In the three decades since the public figure doctrine was first introduced,
the Internet has upended the "centralized, concentrated, and powerful one-to-
many media'' , 6 that was the basis of the original doctrine. Courts face two
particular shifts when applying the legal concept of the public figure to the
online environment: (1) public figures' advantage over private figures in
responding to attacks is reduced online, and (2) the likelihood that an
individual would be thrust into public view is greatly increased. If courts do
53. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 476 n.4 (quoting David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53
TEX. L. REV. 422, 450-51 (1975)).
54. 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
55. See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3 d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that the
defendant was a limited-purpose public figure, not an involuntary public figure); Wells v.
Liddy, 186 F. 3d 505, 540 (4 th Cir. 1999) (finding that the defendant was not an involuntary
public figure). But see Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (identifying an air traffic controller on duty at the time of a crash as an involuntary
public figure).
56. Perzanowski, supra note 43, at 850.
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not maintain a narrow definition of public figures online, these characteristics
could result in a wide expanse of online public figures without the remedial
advantages or voluntariness that play such important roles in justifying their
reduced legal protection.
First, because anyone can easily publish speech on the Internet, the effect of
public figures' "significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication" is limited. 7 Because of this, the advantage that public figures
enjoy over private figures in responding to online speech is limited. Further, a
target of anonymous speech will likely have no information about his
assailant's motivation, experience, or knowledge, and will be subjected to
enhanced public scrutiny, while his assailant will remain protected. This makes
anonymous speech particularly hard to rebut, limiting the impact of the little
increased access that public figures retain. These factors combine to
significantly reduce the advantage public figures enjoy online.
Second, the range of issues that can capture global attention and push a
person into the limelight is much broader in the age of the Internet. A single
video, posted to YouTube, is all that is required to start a phenomenon. s8
Because online speech is inexpensive, long-lasting, and far-reaching, it is
difficult to predict what speech will seize enough public attention to transform
its speaker into a public figure. This undermines the notion of voluntary
accession to publicity that is inherent in the public figure doctrine.
Third, the uncertainty of whether online speech will transform its speaker
into a public figure may dissuade people from contributing to the public
sphere. Faced with reduced legal protection, potential speakers may avoid
speaking if they risk transforming themselves into public figures. While true
public figures have to accept this bargain in order to ensure robust public
debate, the lower the threshold, the more those not seeking publicity will
refrain from even limited contribution, and the less participatory the public
sphere will become. For all three of these reasons, courts should be particularly
cautious when designating a plaintiff an online public figure, lest they premise
their ruling on characteristics that do not apply in the online context and so
dissuade public engagement.
One final complication is how to classify a target of anonymous speech who
chooses to respond with more speech. Because responding to harmful speech
with more speech increases public debate, while responding with litigation can
57. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
870 (1997) ("[A]ny person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.").
58. See, e.g., Tu Thanh Ha, supra note 5.
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limit it, the targets of such speech should be encouraged to respond with more
speech whenever possible. 9 In an online world, where even private figures
often have some access to media, responding to an attack with more speech
could transform a private citizen into a limited-purpose public figure. If this
were the case, however, targets would face perverse incentives to either remain
silent or immediately respond to any potentially actionable statement with a
lawsuit. Both of these outcomes reduce engagement in the public sphere, and
the latter would lead to an increase in costly litigation. Firestone concluded that
a plaintiff who gave several interviews regarding her ongoing lawsuit was not a
limited-purpose public figure, because her case-the subject of the
interviews -did not constitute a public controversy, and her efforts could not
affect its outcome.6"
To give plaintiffs incentives to attempt corrective speech before resorting to
litigation, courts should be similarly cautious about designating
limited-purpose public figures online. Plaintiffs should not be considered
limited-purpose public figures except when they clearly attempt to move
beyond their personal situation and influence a larger debate, such as when a
woman who is attacked online launches a campaign to raise awareness about
online harassment of women. Courts should be cautious even here, however, as
any target who responds with speech will have to reference broader solutions
and questions to some degree. A plaintiff should have repeatedly thrust herself
to the forefront of a debate, reaching beyond her personal experience, before
she is designated a limited-purpose public figure.
C. Distinguishing Between Chilling and Nonchilling Speech
The public figure standard, as adapted to an online context, can be used to
identify when public anonymous speech deserves greater or lesser protection.
Public speech directed at a public figure should receive the highest protection,
while nonpublic speech or speech directed at a private figure should receive
less. Courts should be especially cautious when designating a speaker a public
figure. A target of anonymous speech should not be designated a limited-
purpose or involuntary public figure unless (1) his status is derived from events
that took place before the speech that is at issue; or (2) he holds himself forth
as an advocate beyond simply responding to the speech in question.
Sg. See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) ("[Slpeech can rebut speech,
propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest
government policies." (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
60. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,454-55 (1976).
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Having identified a test to distinguish between types of anonymous speech,
the next Part of this Note develops a single, consistent standard to evaluate
John Doe subpoenas. In so doing, it imports the public figure standard
discussed here into the broader test, proposing a final standard that fairly
balances the interests of plaintiffs and defendants.
III. EVALUATING THE CURRENT STANDARDS AND DEVELOPING A
SINGLE BALANCED STANDARD
Over the past decade, courts have adopted at least seven standards for
evaluating John Doe subpoenas. 61 These standards rely on a wide range of
factors with requirements that vary from permissive to stringent. As a result,
the standards themselves range from pro-plaintiff62 to pro-defendant.6 3
Rather than comparing existing John Doe subpoena standards as
indivisible packages, this Note identifies six major factors that the standards
share. By analyzing these individual factors, rather than the standards as a
whole, it develops a hybrid standard that combines the strengths of the
different standards into a single, balanced proposal. The six factors of John
Doe subpoenas are: (1) ensuring the defendant has notice and opportunity to
respond to the subpoena before his identity is exposed, (2) evaluating the
strength of the plaintiff's case, (3) determining the relevance of the information
sought by subpoena to the plaintiffs claim, (4) balancing the interests of the
plaintiff and defendant, (5) requiring that the plaintiff make his claim and
demonstrate his evidence with specificity, and (6) requiring that the plaintiff
exhaust all alternatives for identifying the plaintiff before turning to a John
Doe subpoena.
Each of these factors will be examined in detail. Before turning to a close
factor-by-factor analysis, however, it is useful to consider the standards that
courts have proposed thus far. This Part begins by briefly introducing the
major John Doe subpoena cases in chronological order. It notes other legal
contexts in which similar challenges arise and identifies the themes that have
61. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 14o F. Supp. 2d 1o88 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Columbia Ins. Co.
v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3 d 712
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008); Doe No. 1 v.
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), 52 Va.
Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
6a. See In reAOL, 52 Va. Cir. 26.
63. See Dendrite, 775 A.2d 756.
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marked the development of John Doe subpoena standards in recent years.
Then it considers the six major factors of John Doe subpoena standards one-
by-one. It determines which factors are necessary for a comprehensive standard
and sets a bar for each factor that balances the needs of plaintiffs and
defendants. As it proceeds, Part III incorporates the First Amendment analysis
discussed in Part II to determine whether the defendant's identity should be
discoverable.
A. Existing John Doe Subpoena Standards
When considering an emerging area of law such as John Doe subpoenas,
analysis often begins with other areas of law that manage similar concerns.
There are at least three areas of law where courts have considered similar
challenges. First, courts evaluating reporters' claims of privilege to protect
anonymous sources must weigh questions of disclosure and speech.6 4 Second,
courts considering strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)
must balance the interests of a defendant claiming that a lawsuit was brought
only to silence and intimidate him against the interests of a plaintiff claiming to
be seeking deserved redress for harm.6' Third, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a statutory framework for third-party
subpoenas seeking the identity of copyright infringers. 6 While academic
authors have argued that these areas of law provide useful templates for
developing general-purpose John Doe subpoena standards, 7 courts have
64. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding the journalist's privilege,
even though the information sought was crucial to the plaintiffs case, because alternative
methods to access the information had not been exhausted); Dangerfield v. Star Editorial,
Inc., 817 F. Supp. 833 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the First Amendment privilege against
disclosure could be overcome by a showing of compelling need); Mitchell v. Superior Court,
690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984) (articulating a standard to evaluate discovery of a reporter's
anonymous source, and ruling that it was not merited in that case).
65. See, e.g., Global Telemedia Int'l Inc. v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(dismissing a cyber-SLAPP suit brought under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004),
California's anti-SLAPP statute, by employing a balancing test).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000); see Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the DMCA standard); Trevor A.
Dutcher, Comment, A Discussion of the Mechanics of the DMCA Safe Harbors and Subpoena
Power, as Applied in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 493 (2005) (discussing the mechanics of DMCA John Doe subpoenas). At least
one court has evaluated a John Doe subpoena for a copyright infringer outside of the DMCA
context. See Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
67. See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity
and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 4 9 3 (2OO1); Sean P.
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preferred instead to base their standards on fundamental First Amendment
principles. In so doing, courts have adopted many of the key factors of privilege
and anti-SLAPP into their standards, making it possible to analyze them
directly in the context of John Doe subpoenas.68 Thus, although this Note will
indicate where parallel legal standards are relevant, it focuses on the seven
standards courts have developed to deal directly with John Doe subpoenas,
which this Section now turns to consider.
The seven major John Doe subpoena standards can be divided into two
rough groups. The first four standards, adopted between 1999 and 20o1, are
examples of early forays and experimentation by courts in addressing this new
field. The three most recent standards, established between 2005 and 2008,
represent the beginning of a growing consensus among courts.
In the first case to consider the difficulties of identifying a defendant
online, Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com,69 the plaintiff alleged that two
of the defendant's websites infringed upon his trademark. The court refused to
grant an injunction unless the defendant could be located, and established a
fairly weak standard to govern the release of an anonymous defendant's
identity. The plaintiff had to (1) demonstrate that his claim was strong enough
to survive a motion to dismiss,7" (2) demonstrate that the information that he
sought would likely lead to identifying the defendant and thus was relevant to
his claim,7 1 and (3) identify all previous steps he had taken to locate the
defendant.
72
Not long after Seescandy.com, an anonymous company sued five posters
who had allegedly defamed it in an America Online (AOL) chat room. AOL
sought to quash the subpoena in Virginia state court. The standard that the
court expressed in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. (In re
Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the Blogosphere: New Solutions for an Old
Problem, 44 DUQ. L. Rrv. 607 (2006); Joseph R. Furman, Comment, Cybersmear or Cyber-
SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213 (2001); Megan M. Sunkel, Comment, And the
I(SP)s Have It... But How Does One Get It? Examining the Lack of Standards for Ruling on
Subpoenas Seeking To Reveal the Identity of Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online
Defamation, 81 N.C. L. REV 1189, 1189 (2003).
68. At least one author has advocated applying the standard from Dendrite, 775 A.2d 756, to the
context of the DMCA. See Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222 (2004).
Sony Music Entertainment Inc. also incorporated factors from several of the cases closely
analyzed in this Note. 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65.
69. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
70. Id. at 579.
71. Id. at 58o.
72. Id. at 579.
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AOL)73 included three factors (overlapping, but not identical to Seescandy.com):
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs argument, (2) the relevance of the information
sought, and (3) the specificity of the plaintiffs evidence.7 4 Although the
Seescandy.com decision had not posed strong protection for the anonymity of its
defendant, the AOL standard was in fact weaker in at least one key respect: the
plaintiff needed only a "good faith basis" for his claim-a significantly lower
requirement than Seescandy.com's motion to dismiss standard.
7
1
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3 also concerned a company suing
anonymous bulletin board posters for allegedly defamatory statements.
76
Dendrite was the first standard to provide robust protection for anonymous
defendants. It required that the plaintiff demonstrate a prima facie case-a
higher bar than either In re AOL or Seescandy.com. 77 Dendrite also included two
new factors. First, it required that the plaintiff attempt to notify the defendant,
and afford him a reasonable opportunity to respond -key steps if a defendant
is to be able to protect his anonymity. Second, Dendrite introduced a balancing
factor, directing the court to "balance the defendant's First Amendment right
of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented
and the necessity for the disclosure." 78 This provided flexibility to judges faced
with a landscape of rapidly evolving technology and law, and gave them an
avenue to consider concerns that were outside the scope of earlier standards,
such as the potential for the defendant to be harmed if his identity were
revealed. Dendrite was a significant early development in John Doe subpoena
standards, and it has been extensively cited by courts developing subsequent
standards.
The final early John Doe subpoena decision, Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc.,
79
was another first- the first time that a plaintiff used a John Doe subpoena to
seek the identity of not only defendants, but also nonparty witnesses. In
2TheMart.com, the plaintiff corporation subpoenaed the identity of twenty-
73. 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
74. Id. at 37.
75. Id.
76. 775 A.2d 756, 763 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Dendrite affirmed the denial of the
plaintiff's motion to discover the defendant's identity. Id. at 772. On the same day, the same
court applied an identical standard in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773, 777 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), but came to the opposite conclusion.
77. Id. at 760. Seescandy.com required that the plaintiff "identify all previous steps taken to locate
the elusive defendant," 185 F.R.D. at 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999), but did not specify what level of
notice was actually required.
78. 775 A.2d at 76o.
79. 140 F. Supp. 2d io88 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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three posters that had taken part in a vitriolic discussion about it on an
anonymous online message board. Despite the fact that the plaintiff had
broadened its search to the identities of nonparties, the standard that the court
settled on was no stronger than In re AOL's, requiring only that the plaintiff
show a good-faith belief in his claim and that the information that he sought
was both relevant and unavailable from any other source.s° Although the court
expressed a weak standard, it nevertheless refused discovery of the identities,
finding that 2TheMart.com had "failed to demonstrate that the identity of the
Internet users [was] directly and materially relevant to a core defense.s
These first four major John Doe subpoena cases, all of which occurred
between 1999 and 2001, have several common characteristics. First, only one of
them-Dendrite-contained a notice provision or balancing test.82 Second,
again with the exception of Dendrite, they provided relatively low bars, making
it likely that plaintiffs could unmask anonymous defendants. Third, although
all of the standards considered the strength of the plaintiff's argument and the
relevance of the information that he sought, the other factors that they
incorporated varied widely. Thus, these early standards describe a pattern of
experimentation by courts centering around fairly weak protection for the
anonymity of online speakers. More recent John Doe subpoena cases have
begun to change this pattern.
Doe No. I v. Cahill,"3 decided in 2005, marked the beginning of a rise in
individuals-'as opposed to companies -seeking John Doe subpoenas. Mr.
Patrick Cahill, a city councilman, sought the identity of a poster who had
attacked him on a blog.s4 He received the defendant's IP address from the
online message board without opposition,8" and then sued the Doe's ISP to
discover his identity.86 The ISP notified the defendant, who filed an emergency
motion.87 Cahill adopted what the court termed "a modified Dendrite standard"
that included only two of Dendrite's five elements. s It retained Dendrite's
8o. See id. at 1095.
81. Id. at 1o96.
82. 775 A.2d at 760.
83. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
84. Id. at 454.
8s. The court provides no indication that the defendant received notice of the release of his IP
address. Id.
86. Id. at 454-55.
87. Id. at 455.
88. Id. at 461.
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notice requirement, 89 and included a modified strength-of-argument factor
that required the plaintiff to demonstrate a claim strong enough to survive an
adverse motion for summary judgment-which, within the Cahill court's
jurisdiction, required the same prima facie evidentiary showing as Dendrite had
called for.9" Because Cahill was a public figure, this showing would ordinarily
have required that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant had spoken
with actual malice.91 The court ruled that this element would be "difficult, if
not impossible" to establish without access to the defendant's identity, and
concluded that plaintiffs should be expected to demonstrate only the elements
of their claim that relied upon knowledge of the defendant's identity.92
Another court considered a John Doe subpoena in 2007, after an
anonymous Internet user obtained a copy of a salacious e-mail that a company
CEO sent to his mistress and distributed it to company management
personnel. The company, Mobilisa, sued for trespass to chattels, arguing that
their computer systems must have been hacked to retrieve the e-mail, and
subpoenaed the anonymous e-mail service that had been used to forward the
e-mail, seeking the defendant's identity.93 Although the central claim in
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe i was property-based, rather than speech-based, the court
concluded that "the potential for chilling anonymous speech remains the
same," and that, as a result, First Amendment concerns should remain central
to its analysis.94 The Mobilisa court expressly adopted Cahill's notice and
adverse summary judgment factors, but reintroduced a Dendrite-style
balancing test factor that would allow revelation of the defendant's identity
only if "a balance of the parties' competing interests favors disclosure."9'
Because the lower court had not properly considered this final balancing factor,
the court remanded "for consideration of that step.",
96
In Krinsky v. Doe 6, the last John Doe subpoena standard that this Note
considers, a corporate officer sued anonymous speakers for personal attacks
against her on a message board.97 Krinsky endorsed a Cahill-Dendrite standard,
89. Id. at 46o-61.
go. Id. at 463.
91. Id. at 464.
92. Id.
93. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P. 3 d 712, 715-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
94- Id. at 719.
95. Id. at 723-24. The question of whether John Doe subpoena standards should include a
balancing test remains unresolved, and is addressed in more detail in Part III.F.
96. Id. at 724.
97. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008).
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with two important distinctions. First, it noted that the defendant had already
been notified by his ISP, making notice by the plaintiff largely of theoretical
import. 98 Second, it concluded that a "summary judgment" standard was
confusing and varied between jurisdictions. As a result, the court returned
instead to the Dendrite terminology requiring "a prima facie showing of the
elements of libel in order to overcome a defendant's motion to quash a
subpoena seeking his or her identity." 99 The court concluded that the messages
"did not constitute assertions of actual fact and therefore were not actionable
under Florida's defamation law."' 00
These three cases demonstrate several important developments. First, their
standards demand stronger showings of plaintiffs than the first four, and
universally require defendant notice -a factor that, of the early cases, only
Dendrite included. This suggests greater recognition by the courts of the
unusual challenges posed by John Doe subpoenas. Second, they are more
consistent than the earlier standards. Rather than varying across all six factors,
they focus on only two: notice to the defendant and the strength of the
plaintiffs argument."0 This provides a perfect opportunity to examine the
direction of John Doe subpoena doctrine before it develops into an entrenched
consensus. Indeed, given the rapid changes to the online environment and the
rise of online harassment, it is especially important to incorporate these
developments into an analysis of John Doe subpoenas while the doctrine is still
forming.
98. See id. at 244.
99. Id. at 24.
ioo. Id. at 251.
101. See table accompanying note 102 for a graphical representation of this phenomenon.
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Before turning to close analysis of the factors that make up John Doe
subpoena standards, however, there are two important concerns to consider
regarding the standard that this Note will propose. First, the standard can
govern the release of the identity of defendants and nonparty witnesses.
2TheMart.com noted that the balance of First Amendment interests in exposing
a nonparty witness differs from revealing the identity of a defendant-an
"exceptional case" is necessary to justify exposing a nonparty witness."' The
standard proposed below is flexible enough to incorporate these shifts, and this
Note will indicate where these shifts would need to be considered.
102. This table shows the factors that each major John Doe subpoena standard includes.
103. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
104. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct.
2000).
105. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 7 7 5 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001).
106. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 14o F. Supp. 2d io88, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
107. Doe No. i v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,461-63 (Del. 2005).
io8. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3 d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
iog. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 231, 244-45 (Ct. App. 2008).
110. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 14o F. Supp. 2d lO88, lO95 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("[N]on-party
disclosure is only appropriate in the exceptional case where the compelling need for the
discovery sought outweighs the First Amendment rights of the anonymous speaker.").
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Second, this standard should be applied only when the information sought
by the plaintiff is sufficient to identify the defendant or nonparty witness. As
noted previously, a plaintiff will often require two steps to identify an
anonymous defendant." ' Ensuring proper notice and opportunity to defend
only against the final step protects defendants' First Amendment interests and
prevents defendants from having two opportunities to mount the same
defense. This is largely how John Doe subpoenas currently function, as services
logging only IP addresses are usually unable to notify defendants. 12 As IP
addresses become more directly traceable and new forms of online
identification are deployed, the definition of information sufficient to positively
identify the defendant will expand. So long as plaintiffs require multiple steps
to identify defendants, however, the initial steps should not be governed by the
standard proposed within this Note. An ordinary subpoena to the third-party
service will be sufficient.
B. Notice and Opportunity To Respond
The first factor that many John Doe subpoena standards consider is
whether the defendant was given notice and an opportunity to respond
anonymously. If the defendant is not notified, the subpoena will only be
challenged if the third party target of the subpoena moves to quash it on the
defendant's behalf."3 Although this is becoming a more common occurrence, it
is certainly not universal. Without a challenge, the subpoena is reviewed ex
parte and often complied with after little or no review. Because of the danger
posed by unjustified discovery of a defendant's identity, it is important that
defendants be informed and given an opportunity to contest their exposure.
An effective notice provision addresses three questions: Who should be
required to notify? How should the defendant be notified? How long should
the defendant have to respond? Each of these elements must be evaluated if a
notice factor is to be properly balanced.
1. Who Should Be Required To Notify?
Both the plaintiff and the third-party target of the subpoena could be
required to notify the defendant. Courts have thus far placed this burden on
plaintiffs. Dendrite directed "the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the
ill. See supra text accompanying note 27.
112. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., In reAOL, 52Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
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anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena. 1 14 Cahill and
Mobilisa included almost identical requests that the plaintiff "undertake
reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant of the discovery
request.".s
Requiring that the plaintiff notify the defendant avoids encumbering the
target of the subpoena-a third party that could easily be completely
uninvolved in the events of the case. Because the plaintiff will often be unable
to locate the defendant, however, requiring him to notify the defendant
burdens him and does not ensure reliable notice.
No court as yet has required that the target of a subpoena notify the
defendant. In some cases, however, ISPs are required by law to notify their
clients before complying.1" 6 The Cable Communications Policy Act only allows
cable company ISPs to release "personally identifiable information"'1 7 about
their clients "if the subscriber is notified of such order by the person to whom
the order is directed.""' While there is no comparable federal law demanding
notice by other types of ISPs, it is increasingly common practice for all ISPs to
voluntarily notify their customers." 9 Considering these factors, Krinsky v. Doe 6
concluded that "when ISPs and message board sponsors ... themselves notify
the defendant ... notification by the plaintiff should not be necessary." 2°
Lidsky has also suggested requiring third-party notice: "[S]ince [the] plaintiff
will ordinarily seek the defendant's identity from an ISP, it is logical to require
the ISP to give notice to its subscriber before disclosing the subscriber's
identity .... '
Because this standard applies only to subpoenas seeking identifying
information,' the target of the subpoena will often be able to locate the
defendant to notify him more effectively than the plaintiff could. If the target is
unable to locate the defendant, a John Doe subpoena would be inappropriate,
114. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
115. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005); see also Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3 d
712, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
116. See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455.
117. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (c)(1) (2000).
118. Id. § 551(c)(2)(B).
119. See, e.g., Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet
Defamation, L.A. LAw, Oct. 20Ol, at 19, 19 ("Most ISPs now give their account holders two
or more weeks' notice of a subpoena before divulging any information in response to it.").
120. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 231, 244 (Ct. App. 2oo8).
121. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1598.
122. See supra text accompanying note ini.
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as the target would not have access to identifying information. At the same
time, "[a]n ISP's primary interest is in minimizing cost and maximizing profit,
not in protecting anonymous speech."' 23 The commitment of ISPs and OSPs to
protecting the identities of their customers is defined as much by business
pressures as by a desire to preserve anonymous speech. The architecture of the
Internet has already pressed them into the role of guardians of their customers'
anonymity. Making them the sole source of notification would further cement
them into a position for which they are at best imperfectly suited. Further,
relying entirely on target notification of defendants would forego several
collateral advantages of plaintiff notification, such as the increased public
scrutiny that comes with publication notice. 4
A comprehensive standard could mitigate this problem by requiring that
both the plaintiff and the target of a subpoena attempt to notify the defendant.
Indeed, Lidsky proposes just such a solution. In addition to recommending ISP
notice to defendants, she also suggests that plaintiffs be required to notify
defendants via publication. 2' This approach combines the benefits of notice by
the plaintiff and notice by the target and ensures the greatest likelihood that
defendants will receive notice. The burden on the target of the subpoena is
mitigated because it will easily be able to locate the defendant to provide notice
as the target must retain identifying information for this standard to apply.
2. How Should the Defendant Be Notified?
Next, the standard should indicate how the defendant is to be notified.
There are at least three possibilities: direct notice, notice via the same method
of communication that the defendant used for the actionable speech, and
publication notice. Direct notice through some verifiable form of
communication is the most certain form of notice. Plaintiffs can almost never
accomplish direct notice, although targets of subpoenas, relying on client
contact records, often can. Although courts have focused on indirect notice,
having both plaintiffs and subpoena targets give notice would assure the
defendant of both the certainty of direct notice and the benefits of the other
forms of notice.
123. Orit Goldring & Antonia L. Hamblin, Note, Think Before You Click: Online Anonymity Does
Not Make Defamation Legal, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. &EMP. L.J. 383, 396 (2003).
124. For more details on the advantages of notification by the plaintiff, see infra Subsection
III.B.2.
125. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1598.
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However it is served, the Court has held that notice must be "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [the defendant] of the
pendency of the action and afford [him] an opportunity to present [his]
objections. "126 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. approved
publication notice for defendants "whose interests or addresses are unknown to
the trustee," but not for more directly reachable defendants.' 27 Thus, the
appropriate form of notice will vary from case to case.
Dendrite required that the plaintiff post "notification of the identity
discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent message
board." ''  This is an uncertain method of notice, as there is no way to ensure
that the defendant will check the message board. Alternatively, if the
defendant's speech occurred through e-mail, notice may be delivered to the
originating e-mail address.2 9 This is still unreliable, however, as there is no
guarantee that the defendant will check the account.
Although publication notice may be the least reliable form of notice, it can
be useful in the context of public speech because it informs the public as well as
the defendant. This can call the veracity of the defendant's speech into
question, allowing plaintiffs to begin to counter the damage of the speech
without actually censoring it. Additionally, it puts the public on notice that the
website or ISP has been subpoenaed. This scrutiny may compel the target to
weigh the subpoena more carefully than it might if the subpoena were hidden
from the public eye. Thus, publication notice carries important benefits beyond
warning the defendant that a subpoena has been issued.
Of course, publication notice is only appropriate if the defendant's speech is
published. Courts can require appropriate, effective notice for a given situation
by tying it to the form of the speech in question. Mobilisa required that "[t]he
requesting party's efforts must include notifying the anonymous party via the
same medium used by that party to send or post the contested message." 3'
Where the speech was public, such effort will require publication notice.
Where private, they will require notice by the same channel as the original
speech. This requirement prevents the plaintiff from claiming that some wildly
inappropriate form of notice is sufficient and ensures the greatest likelihood of
126. United States v. Dusenbery, 223 F.3d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that notice mailed to
a prison inmate was sufficient for a forfeiture action) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), which held that notice must reasonably convey the
required information and afford sufficient opportunity for response).
127. 339 U.S. at 318.
128. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
129. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc.. v. Doe 1, 170 P. 3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
130. Id. at 719.
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notice to the defendant. Thus, while the form of notice will shift depending on
the context of the particular case, an appropriate requirement would be that it
be reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with timely warning, and
effected through the same medium used by the defendant.
3. How Long Should the Defendant Have To Respond?
Finally, courts must determine how long defendants should have to
respond anonymously to a subpoena seeking their identity. Dendrite includes a
flexible time frame, requiring that the court should "withhold action to afford
the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition." '131 Mobilisa and Cahill both include similar requirements. '32 Some
standards include explicit time limits,'33 and many ISPs that do notify their
clients before complying with a subpoena have settled on two weeks as an
appropriate time frame. 34 Nevertheless, it is difficult to apply a fixed
requirement to the uncertainty of anonymous defendant notice. Because a
defendant may not receive notice for days after the plaintiff gives it, the
interests of the defendant suggest that a long response period would be most
appropriate. At the same time, each moment that defamatory speech remains
public can cause additional harm, so the plaintiff's interests suggest that the
limit should remain short, at least for public speech. Given these competing
pressures, a flexible "reasonable opportunity to respond" standard such as
Dendrite's seems most appropriate.
A flexible standard also fits with the reasonableness element presented in
Mullane. It provides the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to respond,
and the plaintiff with a reasonable chance to speedily remove the harmful
speech. This flexibility should not be entirely unbounded, however. Courts
should be suspicious of plaintiffs that provide defendants less than two weeks
to respond. Although such a short window may be appropriate in extreme
circumstances, it provides little opportunity for the defendant to mount a full
defense and should require compelling justification.
131. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 76o.
132. Mobilisa, 170 P. 3d at 719; Doe No. i v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
133. See, e.g., CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 4 25 .16(f) (West 2004) (giving the defendant sixty days to
file a motion to quash a subpoena under California anti-SLAPP law).
134. See Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 119, at 19.
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4. An Appropriate Standard for Defendant Notice
Both the recipient of the subpoena and the plaintiff should make
reasonable efforts to notify the defendant, including notice via the same
medium used by the defendant to send or post the contested message. The
defendant should be afforded a reasonable period to respond to the subpoena.
C. Strength of Plaintiffs Argument
The second key factor for evaluating a John Doe subpoena is the strength
of the plaintiffs claim. It is the most commonly included element in John Doe
subpoena standards - all but one of the seven standards considered in this Note
include such a requirement. 3 ' The strength of argument that a plaintiff must
demonstrate to unmask a defendant varies widely, however. Courts have
required that plaintiffs' claims meet four different standards: good faith,
motion to dismiss, a prima facie evidentiary showing, and summary judgment.
This Section will examine each standard in turn.
1. Good Faith
Only one court has adopted a good faith standard-the weakest of the four
standards considered here. In re AOL required only that the plaintiff
demonstrate "a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim
of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was filed."
136
Good faith provides no concrete standard for courts. According to Krinsky,
"it offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiffs good faith and
leaves the speaker with little protection."137 Cahill considered and rejected a
good faith standard, noting that "[p]laintiffs can often initially plead sufficient
facts to meet the good faith test ... even if the defamation claim is not very
strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a
final decision. '' 3' A good faith standard provides little if any protection for
defendants. Because the unmasking of a defendant's identity can cause
135. Only Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d io88 (W.D. Wash. 2001), does not have a
strength-of-argument factor in its standard. The 2TheMart.com standard is one of the most
pro-plaintiff standards adopted by any court.
136. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
137. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 231, 241 (Ct. App. 2008).
138. 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
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significant harm and deter other anonymous speakers from entering public
debate, defendants deserve more than merely symbolic protection.
2. Survive a Motion To Dismiss
Several courts have required that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claim can
survive a motion to dismiss. Seescandy.com required that the "plaintiff should
establish to the Court's satisfaction that plaintiffs suit against defendant could
withstand a motion to dismiss." 3' Seescandy.com likened this to "[t]he
requirement that the government show probable cause[, which] is, in part, a
protection against the misuse of ex parte procedures to invade the privacy of
one who has done no wrong.
14 0
Seescandy.com was decided in federal court. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
recently clarified the federal motion to dismiss standard for antitrust cases and
suggested that this standard might apply more broadly: a plaintiff can only
survive a motion to dismiss in federal court if he produces factual allegations
that are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. ' On its face, this
standard seems to afford insufficient protection for defendants. Relief can be
more than speculatively possible and still be a virtual impossibility. It may not
be appropriate to risk the unjustified exposure of a defendant's identity if a
plaintiff can meet only this standard.
Transforming this into a national standard also poses another problem:
John Doe subpoenas arise not only in federal court but also in state courts
across the country. The showing necessary for a plaintiff to survive a motion to
dismiss varies from state to state. In a notice pleading state, for instance, "a
complaint need merely set forth a short and plain statement showing the
plaintiff is entitled to relief in order to survive a motion to dismiss." 42 Indeed,
"any allegation that put[s] the opposing party on notice of the claim"'' 43 is
sufficient in a notice pleading state, even if it is "vague or lacking in detail."
14
In states that do not have notice pleading, the standard could be more
139. 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
140. Id.
141. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citation omitted) (ruling on the burden facing a plaintiff to
overcome a motion to dismiss by the defendant).
142. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P. 3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
143. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 231, 243 (Ct. App. 20o8).
144. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005) (quoting VLIW Tech., L.L.C. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 84o A.2d 6o6, 611 (Del. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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substantial. Lassa v. Rongstad, decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
settled on a motion to dismiss standard instead of a more stringent summary
judgment standard because the "silly or trivial libel claims" that would defeat a
motion to dismiss in a notice pleading state would not survive in Wisconsin,
which requires "particularity in the pleading of defamation claims."'14
Relying on a motion to dismiss label to evaluate John Doe subpoenas
would create an inconsistent, uncertain standard that varied not based on
jurisdictions' rulings or the plaintiffs' substantive claims, but on procedural
standards that were never intended to govern anonymous speech. John Doe
subpoenas in different states would be measured against seemingly arbitrarily
varying standards. As a result, a motion to dismiss requirement would likely
lead to forum shopping and reduce the value of adopting a single nationwide
standard.
Requiring that plaintiffs meet a motion to dismiss standard would create
variation among jurisdictions tied neither to a jurisdiction's holdings on
anonymous speech, nor to a plaintiffs substantive claim. Further, motion to
dismiss standards in many jurisdictions would be insufficiently protective of
defendants' interest in anonymity. As a result, a motion to dismiss standard is
inappropriate for evaluating John Doe subpoenas.
3. Withstand a Motion for Summary Judgment
Another standard that several courts have adopted is what Michael Vogel
calls a "'defensive' summary judgment standard."'146 In other words, the
plaintiff must present a case strong enough to overcome a defendant's claim of
summary judgment. In federal court, summary judgment is granted "against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial." '147 Because the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to
establish his case, he must demonstrate prima facie support for each element of
his case to defeat a summary judgment standard.
This standard provides a more specific, measurable level of protection for
defendants. Like a motion to dismiss standard, however, the meaning of a
summary judgment standard varies among state jurisdictions based .on
procedural, rather than substantive, analysis. The Krinsky court rejected both
motion to dismiss and summary judgment standards for exactly this reason:
145. 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006).
146. Vogel, supra note 34, at 850.
147. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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"We find it unnecessary and potentially confusing to attach a procedural label,
whether summary judgment or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a
plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker on the Internet."' 8
A federal summary judgment standard may provide a more appropriate
level of protection to anonymous defendants than a motion to dismiss
standard. The fact that it remains tied to a procedural label that varies across
jurisdictions without regard to substantive concerns, however, means that it is
still a flawed standard for John Doe subpoenas.
4. Establish a Prima Facie Case
Instead of relying on procedural standards, some courts have required
plaintiffs to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of their claim in order to
discover the defendant's identity. This is identical to a federal summary
judgment standard and provides an important level of protection for
anonymous defendants. Further, it avoids the jurisdictional variation problem
of a procedural label. Dendrite relied on a prima facie standard, requiring that
the "plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its
cause of action, on a prima facie basis."1 49 Krinsky, which also required a prima
facie showing from plaintiffs, defined prima facie evidence as "that which will
support a ruling in favor of its proponent if no controverting evidence is
presented. It may be slight evidence which creates a reasonable inference of fact
sought to be established but need not eliminate all contrary inferences."' 10 In
other words, in addition to a demonstration of a legally reasonable claim, the
plaintiff must also provide a strong factual case-absent defendant rebuttals,
contrary facts, and affirmative defenses.
Prima facie standards do vary, both across substantive claims (a prima facie
showing of libel is different from a prima facie showing of trademark
infringement) and across jurisdictions (a prima facie showing of libel in one
state may be different from a prima facie showing of libel in another state).
Indeed, In re AOL rejected this standard for reasons that sound very similar to
the concerns that were raised regarding motion to dismiss and summary
judgment standards: "What is sufficient to plead a prima facie case varies from
state to state and, sometimes, from court to court."'' This variation, however,
148. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244.
149. 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
150. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 n.14 (quoting Evans v. Paye, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 925 n.13 (Ct. App.
1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. 52Va. Cir. 26,36 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
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is not problematic in the same way that the variance of motion to dismiss and
summary judgment standards is. What is required to make a prima facie
showing of an element of a claim does not vary between jurisdictions or
substantive areas of the law. Rather, the elements for which a plaintiff must
make a prima facie showing of his claim varies. For example, a prima facie
claim of libel in Florida requires that the plaintiff show that "the defendant
published a false statement about the plaintiff to a third party and that the false
statement caused injury to the plaintiff."1 2 By contrast, in Delaware, proving
libel requires the plaintiff to show that "i) the defendant made a defamatory
statement; 2) concerning the plaintiff; 3) the statement was published; . .. 4) a
third party would understand the character of the communication as
defamatory[; and] 5) the statement is false."'5 3 The meaning of a prima facie
showing does not differ among the jurisdictions; by contrast, the requirements
that a plaintiff must satisfy to establish that showing vary.
Rather than subjecting parties to a procedural standard that was not
designed to govern substantive law, this variation allows jurisdictions to
express differences of opinion on First Amendment doctrine. This variation is
not only an important expression of federalism, it is compelled by Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."'' 4
Overall, a prima facie standard effectively balances the First Amendment
interests of plaintiffs and defendants, compels plaintiffs to specifically assert
their claims, and ensures meaningful variation reflecting jurisdictional
disagreements on substantive law. It is the most appropriate standard to
require plaintiffs to meet when seeking to unmask anonymous defendants.
5. The Problem ofElements That Are Beyond the Plaintiff's Control
Requiring that plaintiffs make a prima facie showing leaves one final
stumbling block. As Michael Vogel has noted, providing prima facie support
for a plaintiffs claim "will often depend dispositively on the identity of the
defendant.... [Ti he plaintiff will need to know the defendant's identity, and
152. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3 d at 247 (citing Valencia v. Citibank Int'l, 728 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999)).
153. Doe No. i v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005). Because the plaintiff in Cahill was a
public figure, the court also required that the plaintiff show actual malice on the part of the
defendant to prove libel. Id. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established this requirement
nationally, so it does not vary among jurisdictions, but applies for all public figure plaintiffs.
376 U.S. 254, 279-8o (1964).
154. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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in all likelihood take the defendant's deposition, to meet that burden.' s55 For
instance, where the plaintiff is a public figure, he must show that the defendant
acted with actual malice to prove a claim of defamation.', 6 As Vogel notes, it is
extremely difficult to make a prima facie showing of actual malice without
knowledge of the defendant's identity. 
7
Several courts have addressed this concern by requiring merely that
plaintiffs substantiate elements of their claims that are "within the requesting
party's control -in other words, all elements not dependent upon knowing the
identity of the anonymous speaker.' ', 8 This removes the impossible burden
from the shoulders of the plaintiff. At the same time, however, excusing the
plaintiff from a prima facie showing of any element that relies on the
defendant's identity weakens the defendant's protection for a number of
potential claims. Often, as with defamation, this weakens the standard to
which the plaintiff is held just when the law indicates the standard should be
especially high. As a full prima facie standard provides too high a bar, and fully
relieving plaintiffs of responsibility for elements beyond their control provides
too low a bar, some intermediate standard seems necessary.
In Part II, this Note argued that public speech concerning public figures
deserves special protection. This distinction can be effectively imported into
John Doe subpoena standards by requiring public figure plaintiffs responding
to public speech to meet some reduced showing of proof regarding elements
beyond their control, but excusing private figure plaintiffs from this burden.
This will distinguish between speech that is especially valued, and so should be
protected at all costs, and speech -such as the harassment of private figures -
that could chill more speech than it creates and rob the public sphere of
valuable contributions.
6. Heightened Standard for Public Figure Plaintiffs
The only question remaining is what intermediate standard ought to be
imposed on elements of claims concerning public speech brought by public
figure plaintiffs that are beyond the plaintiffs' control. One author who has
proposed a heightened standard of protection for political speech suggested a
155. Vogel, supra note 34, at 807-08.
156. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
157. Vogel, supra note 34, at 807-08.
158. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
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standard that could be appropriate here."5 9 Under his proposal, the plaintiff
would only be able to discover a defendant's identity for political speech if he
could "show that the defamatory language at issue was of such an egregious
nature that the plaintiff' would likely be able to produce "evidence of actual
malice at trial."16 ' If this standard were applied only to elements beyond the
plaintiffs control, it could represent an intermediate increase in the burden for
public figure plaintiffs responding to public speech.
However, what constitutes particularly "egregious" speech is by no means
clear. No guidance is provided regarding the context in which speech should be
considered egregious. If egregiousness simply means vulgarity or
outrageousness, then the standard does not seem appropriate. Although vile
speech may make readers cringe, its vileness does not determine whether its
speaker is culpable. Given that the standard was offered within the context of
defamation, it could be that egregiousness refers to egregiously false or
egregiously malicious. While this is more appropriate than simple vileness,
however, what would constitute egregiously false remains unclear. Egregious
maliciousness could mean that the defendant was particularly reckless and
uncaring regarding the falsity of his statement. Requiring that the plaintiff
meet this burden, however, seems tantamount to requiring a demonstration of
actual malice. Thus, the. "egregiousness" standard seems either unclear or no
weaker than an ordinary prima facie showing.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,i6' a recent Supreme Court case
concerning securities fraud, presents another possibility. Because abusive
litigation is a problem in securities fraud (not unlike the challenges of John
Doe subpoenas), the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
has "[e]xacting pleading requirements.162 To establish securities fraud, the
plaintiff must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 6 ' A similar standard
could be an appropriate intermediate requirement in the John Doe subpoena
context: The plaintiff must state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference of each element of his claim that relies on the defendant's identity.
This standard does not hinge on an uncertain term such as "egregiousness." As
159- Ryan M. Martin, Comment, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1217
(2007).
16o. Id. at 1243.
i6f. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding that a strong inference of the scienter required for securities
fraud had not been established, and remanding for further consideration).
162. Id. at 2504.
163. 15 U.S.C. S 7 8u-4 (b)(2) (2000).
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a result, its requirements are more grounded, and the standard itself is less
open to untethered judicial interpretation.
The strong inference standard also provides jurisprudential analysis that
can be used to inform its meaning. In Tellabs, the Court concluded that "[t]o
qualify as 'strong' ... an inference ... must be more than merely plausible or
reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
inference .... ,16 4 In other words, to meet this standard, there must be no other
reasonable inference that is more likely to be true than the plaintiff's claim.
This is certainly a more specific standard than the "egregiousness"
standard. It imposes a significant burden, but only on public figure plaintiffs
responding to public speech-the form of anonymous speech identified by
courts as most deserving of protection. This distinction will make it possible
for private targets of anonymous online speech to respond effectively while
protecting the classic form of anonymous speech directed at public figures.
7. An Appropriate Standard for the Strength of the Plaintiffs Argument
Incorporating the public figure analysis from Part II results in a bifurcated
standard that appropriately distinguishes between public and private online
speech, demanding a higher burden of proof from public figure plaintiffs faced
with public speech.
If the plaintiff is not a public figure, or the defendant's speech was not
public, the plaintiff must produce prima facie support of all elements of the
case within his control. If the plaintiff is a public figure responding to public
speech, he must provide prima facie support for each element within his
control and state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of
each element that is outside his control.
D. Relevance of Information Sought
A third factor of many John Doe subpoena standards is a requirement that
the information sought by the plaintiff have some degree of relevance to the
plaintiffs case. The degree of relevance required can vary widely, with the
information sought needing to be anything from simply useful to vital to the
plaintiff's claim. Shifting this bar will determine whether a plaintiff can use a
John Doe subpoena to engage in a virtual fishing expedition based on
suspicion, or whether he will be constrained to pursuing only leads that are
reasonably supported prior to the John Doe subpoena.
164. 127 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
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In re AOL required that "the subpoenaed identity information is centrally
needed to advance [the plaintiffs] claim."' 6 5 Cases involving journalists'
protection of anonymous sources have also relied heavily on requiring that the
information sought be central to the plaintiff's case. Mitchell v. Superior Court,
for instance, required that a journalist could only be compelled to reveal his
sources if their identities went "to the heart" of the plaintiff's claim. 66
Similarly, 2TheMart.com only allowed the release of information that was
"directly and materially relevant to [a core] claim or defense. ',, 67 In discussing
this high standard, the court noted that "[u]nder the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure discovery is normally very broad, requiring disclosure of any
relevant information that 'appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.' But when First Amendment rights are at
stake, a higher threshold of relevancy must be imposed." 6 2TheMart.com paid
particular attention to its relevancy requirement because the plaintiff sought
the identity of nonparty witnesses in addition to defendants. When courts
applying this Note's standard consider subpoenas for nonparty witnesses, they
should be especially critical of information requests that are not central to the
plaintiff s claim.
A relevancy requirement with a fairly high bar is an important element of
any John Doe subpoena standard that seeks to protect defendants' First
Amendment rights. Without a relevancy requirement, plaintiffs can use even a
tangential claim as a reason to expose an anonymous speaker. Dendrite
incorporates relevancy analysis into its balancing test factor. 6, Considering
relevance separately, however, ensures that courts will explicitly consider the
necessity of the information that the plaintiff seeks. This will limit the ability of
ingenious plaintiffs to uncover and expose unnecessary, potentially
embarrassing information about a defendant simply as a form of self-help,
rather than as part of a larger legal claim.
One formulation of a standard that would address these concerns would be
as follows: The plaintiff shall demonstrate that the information sought by
subpoena is necessary for the identification of the defendant, and that the
defendant's identity is central to the plaintiffs case.
165. 52Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
166. 690 P.2d 625, 632 (Cal. 1984).
167. 14o F. Supp. 2d lo88, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
168. Id. at 1O96 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
169. 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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E. Specificity of Crime and Evidence
Another factor that some courts have used to prevent plaintiffs from using
unfounded allegations as a cover for a John Doe subpoena is to require
specificity from the plaintiff. While courts have required specificity of evidence,
specificity of information sought is also relevant. Both compel the plaintiff to
produce detail, affording the court and the defendant an opportunity to
examine and rebut questionable assertions. Both of these forms of specificity
serve important roles. Both, however, can be incorporated into other factors
without being adopted as independent elements themselves.
In re AOL and Dendrite both contain specificity of evidence requirements.
Dendrite requires that the plaintiff "identify and set forth the exact statements
purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes
actionable speech.' 17' Although In re AOL does not impose a similar
requirement as part of its standard, its discussion directs the plaintiff "to
produce the subject Internet postings, so that the Court [can] better determine
whether there is, in fact, a good faith basis for [plaintiffs] allegations. ' 17' A
specificity of evidence requirement ensures that plaintiffs clearly state the basis
of their claims against defendants, providing some limited protection against
John Doe subpoenas based on frivolous claims. In re AOL, which only requires
that the plaintiff demonstrate a good faith claim, needs a specificity
requirement because good faith does not require specificity. To meet the prima
facie showing required by Dendrite and other more recent standards, however,
a plaintiff must make a specific showing of his evidence.1 72 Thus, for these
higher bars, a separate specificity factor is not necessary. The Cahill court
concluded that a specificity requirement was unnecessary because "[t]o satisfy
the summary judgment standard a plaintiff will necessarily quote the
defamatory statements in his complaint.' 73 Since the standard proposed in this
Note, like Dendrite, relies on a prima facie standard, no separate specificity of
evidence requirement is necessary.
A specificity requirement should also be incorporated into another factor:
the relevance of information sought. A clever plaintiff could use a broadly
relevant search for the defendant's identity as cover to seek irrelevant,
damaging, and embarrassing details about the defendant, such as websites he
170. Id.
171. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
172. See, e.g., Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
173. 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). Cahill refers to the Dendrite standard as a "summary
judgment" standard, even though it is actually a prima facie standard.
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visited or online services he used. Incorporating a requirement of specificity of
information sought into the language adopted in the previous section will
prevent this behavior. Instead of requiring only that "the plaintiff shall
demonstrate that the information sought by subpoena is necessary,1 74 updated
language would read: "The plaintiff shall demonstrate that each specific
element of information sought by subpoena is necessary.' 17' This addition will
ensure that not only the defendant's identity, but also each piece of information
sought by a John Doe subpoena, is needed to advance the plaintiff s claim.
One article advising plaintiffs lawyers in anonymous online speech cases
recommends that "[tihe subpoena directed to the ISP should be broad in
scope. It should ask for all ISP logs tracking the times, dates, and places of any
offending postings by an anonymous poster as well as ... the poster's name,
address, and telephone number.' ', 6 Requiring specificity will prevent
overbroad discovery requests. A stand-alone specificity factor is unnecessary,
however. Specificity elements can be incorporated into the strength-of-
argument and relevance factors where appropriate. With this adjustment, a
freestanding specificity factor is unnecessary.
F. Balancing the Rights of the Plaintiff and the Defendant
Another element that some courts have considered when evaluating John
Doe subpoenas is an explicit balancing of plaintiffs' and defendants' interests.
John Doe subpoenas arise with varied contexts, actors, and substantive claims
and rely on rapidly developing technology. These shifting, unpredictable
pressures make it very difficult to encapsulate all the factors a judge might need
to consider. A flexible balancing factor would allow them to balance the
varying First Amendment interests that will develop in John Doe subpoena
cases.
Courts have used the balancing tests to incorporate considerations that
were left out of the rest of their standard. Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does
1-4o, for instance, set the interests of the plaintiffs and defendants against each
other through a specific inquiry into the defendants' expectation of privacy.7'
As the court concluded, "[D]efendants' First Amendment right to remain
anonymous must give way to plaintiffs' right to use the judicial process to
174. See supra Section III.B.
175. For the full text of the updated factor, see infra Section V.A.
176. Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 119, at 19.
177. 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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pursue what appear to be meritorious copyright infringement claims.' ' 8
Similarly, Dendrite instructs courts to "balance the defendant's First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima
facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous
defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed."' 79 This
incorporates both the value of the defendant's anonymous speech and the
relevance of the information sought.
Cahill rejected Dendrite's balancing test because " [t]he [balancing test] adds
no protection above and beyond that of the summary judgment test and
needlessly complicates the analysis. " s' In other words, if a plaintiff must
demonstrate a claim that will survive a motion for summary judgment to
discover a defendant's identity, the court must already balance the defendant's
right to anonymous speech against the strength of the plaintiffs claim. The
standard proposed in this Note requires a similar balancing as part of its prima
facie standard. Although this does suggest that the specific balancing test
outlined in Dendrite may be unnecessary, Cahill does not consider "whether
balancing a broader range of competing interests is warranted.
18
,
Mobilisa rejected Cahill's elimination of the balancing test, concluding that
there were other factors that should be considered in a balancing test, including
"the type of speech involved, the speaker's expectation of privacy, the potential
consequence of a discovery order to the speaker and others similarly situated,
the need for the identity of the speaker to advance the requesting party's
position, and the availability of alternative discovery methods."12 Indeed, there
are several elements that courts should consider as part of a broader balancing
test. First, there should be some consideration of the potential consequences of
a discovery order on the defendant. Few consequences would be severe enough
to tip the scales in the defendant's favor, but the threat of bodily harm, or even
death, would be one such example. 8 ' A balancing test also provides the court
with an opportunity to consider whether the information sought relates to a
defendant or only to a nonparty witness.
A balancing test can also raise concerns, however. Michael Vogel warns that
a balancing test could swallow the entire standard: "In effect, the court
acknowledges that, even if plaintiff has alleged a viable legal claim against the
178. Id. at 567.
179. 775 A.2d at 76o-61.
18o. 884 A.2d at 461.
181. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3 d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
182. Id. (footnote omitted).
183. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1601-02.
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defendant ... the court may still exercise discretion to stop the case in its
tracks.'''84 A balancing test does provide broad power to judges with less
accountability than a more rigidly defined standard. To mitigate this danger
but retain the flexibility of a balancing test, it should be applied when the court
is faced with an especially close case. If applying the first three factors of this
Note's standard does not lead a court to a clear conclusion, it can then turn to
this balancing test to manage the technological or legal complexity that led to
the uncertainty.
An appropriate balancing test factor would be as follows: If the first three
factors do not yield a clear outcome, the court should balance the hardships
and the relative First Amendment interests of the plaintiff and defendant, and
give preference to whichever party bears the greater burden under this test.
G. Exhaustion ofAlternatives
Finally, some John Doe subpoena standards require that the plaintiff
demonstrate that he has exhausted all other means to identify the defendant.
Seescandy.com required that the plaintiff "identify all previous steps taken to
locate the elusive defendant. '' l8s Similarly, 2TheMart.com required that the
plaintiff show that "information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim
or defense is unavailable from any other source. ,,86
This requirement is an effort to ensure that plaintiffs will resort to John
Doe subpoenas only when absolutely necessary. As such, it is unnecessary if the
John Doe subpoena standard properly balances the interests of the plaintiff and
defendant. If that is the case, then there is no need to press plaintiffs toward an
alternate method of discovery. There will be no danger of them taking
advantage of the defendants because the standard prevents it. It should be no
surprise that Seescandy.com and 2TheMart.com are relatively weak standards.
These requirements that plaintiffs use John Doe subpoenas only as a last resort
suggest that the courts were concerned about the balance between plaintiff and
defendant and sought to limit the standards' application.
IV.A SINGLE STANDARD FOR JOHN DOE SUBPOENAS
Combining the factors listed above yields a single John Doe subpoena
standard that prevents frivolous attempts to unmask defendants, balances the
184. Vogel, supra note 34, at 8o8.
185. 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
186. 14o F. Supp. 2d 1o88, 1O95 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
118:320 2008
JOHN DOE SUBPOENAS
concerns of plaintiffs and defendants, and incorporates a consideration of the
First Amendment value of defendants' and plaintiffs' speech. This final Part
articulates the full proposed standard, and then applies the standard to a recent
controversy.
A. Identifying an Anonymous Defendant
The standard involves four elements. First, both the recipient of the
subpoena and the plaintiff should make reasonable efforts to notify the
defendant, including notice via the same medium used by the defendant to
send or post the contested message. The defendant should be afforded a
reasonable period to respond to the subpoena.
Second, the court should evaluate the strength of the plaintiffs argument.
If the plaintiff is not a public figure, or the defendant's speech was not public,
he must produce prima facie support of all elements of the case within his
control. If the plaintiff is a public figure responding to public speech, however,
he must provide a prima facie showing of each element within his control and
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of each element
that is outside his control. In evaluating this factor, the court must determine
whether the plaintiff is a public figure. The court should be very cautious in
declaring a plaintiff a public figure based only on online speech, and should not
declare the plaintiff a limited-purpose or involuntary public figure unless his
status is derived from events that took place before the speech that is at issue or
he utilizes his public status to hold himself forth as an advocate beyond simply
responding to the speech in question.
Third, the plaintiff shall demonstrate that each specific element of
information sought by subpoena is necessary for the identification of the
defendant, and that the defendant's identity is central to the continuation of
the plaintiffs case. It is important to note that, as discussed above, both this
and the previous factor include requirements of specificity, requiring detailed
production from the plaintiff without imposing a fifth factor.
Fourth, if the first three factors do not yield a clear outcome, the court
should balance the parties' interests, giving preference to the party whose
hardships and First Amendment interests are greater.
This standard strengthens the two central factors of recent John Doe
subpoena standards -notice and a prima facie showing by the plaintiff-by
adding third-party notice and requiring an additional showing from public
figure plaintiffs. In addition, it explicitly evaluates two factors that recent
courts have preferred to consider implicitly. In addition to providing strong
protection for most anonymous speech, the standard is also bifurcated-
providing significantly stronger protection for speech that targets public
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
figures rather than private figures. This ensures that speech on matters of
public concern - the center of public debate - is protected, while private targets
of anonymous harassment will have an opportunity to expose their attackers.
B. Applying the Standard: AutoAdmit
The AutoAdmit case-Doe I v. Individuals, Whose True Names Are
Unknown' sT- arises out of an anonymous online message board frequented by
undergraduate and professional students, including law students.' In
addition to discussions about law school, postings included a range of harsh,
sometimes violent or threatening speech with racist and sexist themes." The
posts targeted active users and nonusers alike, calling them out by name and
harassing, threatening, and mocking them.' 90 Most of the targets were women,
and the threats and harassment were frequently sexual, including wild claims
and violent fantasies."" In 2007, two of the targets sued, alleging a series of
claims ranging from defamation to copyright infringement.'92
The plaintiffs' first response was not to file a lawsuit. According to the
plaintiffs' brief, they first contacted the website administrators, asking that the
postings be removed.'93 When this failed, they spoke out to the Washington
Post and others, seeking to use public pressure and more speech to combat the
alleged defamation. '9 4 When the plaintiffs did bring suit, one of their first steps
was to seek discovery of the identity of their pseudonymous defendants
through John Doe subpoenas. 9 One of the defendants (charged under the
user name "AK 47 ") filed a motion to quash the subpoena to his ISP."96 The
187. No. 3:07-CV-9o9 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 8, 2007).
188. See AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com (last visited Oct. 27, 20o8).
189. See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at Ai.
19o. See id.
191. See Citron, supra note io, at lo.
192. See Second Amended Complaint, Doe I, No. 3 :07-CV-909 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 20o8), available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/autoadmit.pdf. For more detail on the
events leading up to the lawsuit, see Citron, supra note io, at 10-14.
193. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 192, at 23; see also Jarret Cohen, Challenge to
Reputation Defender (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.autoadmit.com/challenge.to.reputation.
defender.html.
194. See Nakashima, supra note 189.
195. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 192.
196. John Doe 21's Memorandum in Support of Motion To Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena, Doe I,
No. 3:o7-CV- 9 o 9 , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
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motion was denied.1 97 Evaluating this motion to quash provides an excellent
opportunity to examine how this Note's standard might be applied.
First, notice to the defendant was adequate. The plaintiffs posted "notice
regarding the subpoenas on AutoAdmit in January of 20o8, " 98 thus serving
notice through the same medium as the speech. They posted notice on January
25,199 and issued their subpoena on February i.2 0 0 On February 7, AT&T, the
recipient of the subpoena, directly notified the defendant, giving the defendant
until February 25, the subpoena's date of production, to respond with a motion
to quash.2"' As a result, the defendant had one month from the date of notice
by publication, and eighteen days from the date of direct notice by AT&T.
Notice from the plaintiff and target reinforced each other, combining to ensure
that the defendant had an appropriate opportunity to respond. In this case,
defendant received notice, filing a motion to quash on February 25.2"2
Second, the standard requires an evaluation of the strength of the plaintiffs'
argument. To do this, one must first determine whether the plaintiffs were
private or public figures. The fact that the Doe I plaintiffs attempted to respond
with more speech before resorting to litigation makes this analysis particularly
difficult. Prior to becoming targets of online speech, the plaintiffs were both
private figures. The court should determine if their response to the allegedly
defamatory speech is sufficient to transform them into public figures.
Analyzing this would require the court to answer two questions: First, is their
public speech significant enough to transform them into public figures?
Second, is the topic of their speech a public controversy, or is it a "matter of
public concern merely to gossips"?"°3 Under the limited framework that this
Note proposes, the plaintiffs would likely only be considered limited-purpose
public figures if they spoke out significantly on a public controversy, rather
than simply responding to personal attacks.
In this case, the plaintiffs' comments during interviews were focused on
their personal experiences. 0 4 This places them squarely in the context of
197. Doe 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *22.
198. Id. at *13.
199. Id. at *6 n.3.
200. Id. at *5.
2o. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Opposition to John Doe 21'S Motion to
Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena at s, Doe I, No. 3:07-CV-9o9, 20o8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749.
202. See Doe 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *5-6.
203. Lorain journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 n.9 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 189 ("'I didn't understand what I'd done to deserve it,' said
the student. 'I also felt kind of scared because it was someone in my community who was
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Firestone, suggesting that they did not become public figures. °s In addition to
these interviews, the plaintiffs were represented by Reputation Defender, a
company that claims to "deliver CONTROL over how others are able to
perceive you on the Internet. ''206 The company attempted to pressure
AutoAdmit to remove the allegedly defamatory speech, relying on news
coverage and direct contact. Finally, one of the plaintiffs published a
retrospective in a law journal describing her experience.20 7 The article focuses
primarily on the plaintiffs experiences as a target of online harassment,2 8 but
it also discusses possible legal and social solutions to the plaintiffs situation.20 9
Thus, while it focuses on the experiences of one of the plaintiffs, it also engages
the broader debate.
As noted above, it would have been very difficult for the plaintiffs to
respond with more speech without at least some spillover into the broader
question of online harassment.2 1  Thus, the plaintiffs' speech does not
necessarily make them public figures. Indeed, there are at least four reasons
why a court would likely not find the plaintiffs to be limited public figures,
despite their public speech. First, although the plaintiffs did reference the
broader context of online harassment, their speech predominantly focused on
their personal conflict, rather than an effort to thrust themselves into the
forefront of the larger debate. Second, the Hutchinson v. Proxmire Court was
unwilling to grant that academic articles, which reach only a "relatively small
category of professionals," were sufficient to transform their author into a
public figure.2 1  Third, the plaintiffs spoke only a handful of times over a
limited period, and then abruptly stopped even though the controversy
continued. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, "a few press conferences" were insufficient
to transform the plaintiff into a public figure. 2 Here, the speech was similarly
limited in both time frame and scope. Finally, the plaintiffs' public status was
threatening physical and sexual violence and I didn't know who."'); Jeff Tyler, Get Yourselfa
Little Online Privacy, MARKETPLACE, Mar. 2, 2007, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/
display/web/2oo7/o3/o2/an online-identity ("People would bring that up to me in the
interview. So when they did, I knew they had searched me on the Internet.").
205. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
2o6. ReputationDefender, Company: About Us, http://www.ReputationDefender.conVcompany
(last visited Oct. 27, 2o8).
207. Article on file with author to preserve the plaintiffs anonymity.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra Section II.B.
211. 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
212. 424 U.S. 448, 454 n.3 (1976).
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created by the efforts of their anonymous assailants." 3 If the plaintiffs' efforts
to respond to the allegedly defamatory attacks with more speech were to
transform them into public figures, numerous targets in similar situations
might be motivated to turn immediately to legal responses. This incentive
would reduce public engagement online and induce targets to choose
censorship over more speech-exactly the opposite of what would strengthen
the public sphere.2 14 These factors suggest that the plaintiffs' speech was
neither significant enough to transform them into public figures nor focused
on a public controversy. As a result, they were probably not transformed into
limited-purpose public figures by the events leading up to their case.
Because the plaintiffs remained private figures, they had to produce prima
facie support of only the elements of the case within their control. The court
noted the applicable Connecticut standard for libel: "(1) Doe 21 published a
defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a
third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person;
and (4) the plaintiffs reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.""' s
As none of these factors rely on the defendant's identity, the private figure
plaintiffs would need to provide prima facie support for each of them. Given
that prima facie evidence "may be slight evidence which creates a reasonable
inference of fact sought to be established but need not eliminate all contrary
inferences, "121 6 the plaintiffs likely met this burden. Indeed, the Connecticut
court also found that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of their
claims.
2 17
Third, the court should evaluate the relevance of the information that the
plaintiffs sought to their case. It is clear that the identity of the defendant was
central to the continuation of the plaintiffs' case, as it could not proceed
without a named defendant. Further, the plaintiffs sought only "the name,
address, telephone number, and email address" of the defendant. 8 This is a
limited set of information that is necessary for identifying the defendant.
Finally, if the first three factors do not yield a clear outcome, the standard
directs the court to balance the First Amendment and privacy interests of the
213. See Perzanowski, supra note 43; see also Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 135; supra text accompanying
note 54.
214. See supra Section II.B.
215. Doe I v. Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, No. 3:07-CV-909, 20o8 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48749, at *17 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
16. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 231, 245 n.14 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Evans v. Paye, 37
Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 925 n.13 (Ct. App. 1995)).
a17. Doe I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *20.
218. Id. at *14.
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plaintiffs and defendants. In this case, the court would not need to reach the
balancing test, as the first three factors were tilted in favor of the plaintiffs. It is
worth noting, however, that the balancing test would lean in favor of the
plaintiff.as well. The speech in question was exactly the sort of anonymous
harassment that was discussed above, and anonymity in this case was as likely
to chill speech as to protect it. Further, the defendant had no special fears of
exposure that might outweigh what the plaintiffs already faced.
When applied to this motion to quash, the standard comes down on the
side of the plaintiffs. The application provides an important reminder of how
narrow the public/private figure distinction has become online, as the Internet
brings public speech within everyone's grasp. To keep a balance of First
Amendment interests online, courts will need to be cautious when designating
speakers as public figures, and expect the distinctions between the two groups
to continue to narrow.
CONCLUSION
The ability to speak anonymously is critical to the openness of the Internet.
The loss of the right to anonymous speech online would be a grave blow to the
vibrancy of the public sphere. At the same time, however, anonymity can foster
vicious attacks, especially those that would be socially unacceptable in
traditional public discourse. This phenomenon cannot be erased entirely-
indeed, it should not be. The wholesale elimination of such unpleasant speech
would necessarily encompass valuable, protected speech in its sweep.
Nevertheless, the increasing complexity of the online environment demands
standards that govern online speech with increasing nuance. By distinguishing
between speech targeted at private and public figures, and by distinguishing
speech on public controversies, the standard that this Note proposes would
ensure heightened protection for the speech that is most beneficial to the public
sphere while simultaneously providing the targets of anonymous harassment a
balanced opportunity to unmask their attackers.
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